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1Abstract
We use mechanism design to study eﬃcient intertemporal payment arrangements when the
ability of agents to perform certain welfare-improving transactions is subject to random and
unobservable shocks. Eﬃciency is achieved via a payment system that assigns balances to
participants, adjusts them based on the histories of transactions, and periodically resets
them through settlement. Our analysis has several implications for the design of actual
payment systems. Eﬃciency requires that, in order to overcome informational frictions,
agents participating in transactions that do not involve monitoring frictions subsidize those
that are subject to such frictions. Optimal settlement frequency should balance liquidity
costs from settlement against the need to provide intertemporal incentives. Settlement costs
must be borne by agents for whom the incentives to participate in the system are highest.
Finally, an increase in settlement costs implies that, in order to counter a higher exposure
to default, the frequency of settlement must increase and, at the same time, the volume of
transactions must decrease.
Keywords: Payment Systems, Frequency of Settlement, Liquidity Costs, Subsidization
across Transactions
21 Introduction
One of the features of the economy that Walrasian models abstract from concerns the in-
stitutions through which payments for goods and services take place: the payment system
(PS). This results in the need for a framework that can guide policy makers in the eﬃcient
design of such systems. This paper builds such a framework using mechanism design.
Our approach involves three main ingredients. First, it is explicitly dynamic, emphasizing
the role of intertemporal incentives. This is important since actual payment systems almost
always involve repeated interactions between the system and its participants.1 For example,
the PS might need to make use of intertemporal incentives in order to explore the agents’
willingness to participate and carry out transactions eﬃciently. Second, we emphasize the
role of private information.2 Actual PS design is subject to a private information problem
since whether or not participants can perform certain transactions is not directly observable.
For example, within a retail PS, the ability of a consumer to make a credit-card payment
might not be observable. Similarly, within a wholesale system, banks might have private
information about their ability to meet certain payment obligations. The third distinguishing
feature of our analysis is that, unlike most of the literature in mechanism design, since we
model the entire payment system, rather than a particular transaction or participant in
isolation, we must take into consideration general equilibrium eﬀects.
We employ a version of the search model that Kiyotaki and Wright (1989, 1993) devel-
oped in order to study monetary exchange. In contrast to the monetary theory approach,
however, our model involves a “cashless” environment. This framework is appropriate for
1The existing literature on PS is almost exclusively static (see Kahn and Roberds (1998, 2001) for two
prominent papers). Kahn (2006) provides an excellent summary of the current literature and outlines some
of the main open questions in PS research.
2Hence, our work is related to the dynamic contracting literature (see Green (1987), and Spear and
Srivastava (1987), among others). Our analysis also relates to recent work by Kocherlakota (2005), who
extends the model of Mirrlees (1971) to a dynamic economy. The payment system in our model plays an
analogous role to that of the tax authority in Kocherlakota (2005): it explores intertemporal incentives in
order to decentralize eﬃcient allocations under private information.
3our objective for several reasons. First, it involves an explicit role for transactions, and it
naturally incorporates frictions such as private information and lack of commitment. Second,
the random matching shocks that agents are subject to in this model are a tractable way of
modelling random needs for liquidity. This is important in actual PS where participants are
subject to random needs for making payments to one another. Third, the model is consis-
tent with the fact that actual transactions are bilateral and, frequently, subject to private
information. Finally, this setup naturally lends itself to mechanism design.
We will assume that each transaction involves an agent that enjoys an instantaneous
beneﬁt: the “consumer,” and an agent that suﬀers an instantaneous cost: the “producer.”3
In the presence of private information about the ability of agents to produce or consume,
the rules imposed by the PS must provide the right incentives for its participants to be
part of the arrangement and to reveal their information truthfully. The PS in our model
accomplishes this by assigning individual “balances” and by specifying rules on how these
balances are updated given the participants’ trading histories. Furthermore, the PS requires
that balances are periodically “settled”.4 This implies that participants are required to
periodically “reset” their balances through centralized trading in what we will model as a
Walrasian market. Optimal PS design involves providing incentives so that the eﬃcient
volume of transactions is carried out.
We use our framework to study two issues pertinent to the design of actual PS. The ﬁrst
concerns the structure of optimal balance adjustments in transactions between settlement
periods. Our model shows that an optimal PS must shift the costs of providing incentives
from the transactions stage to the settlement stage. Producers in the transactions stage
3There are several ways to rationalize such costs and gains. In a wholesale PS, for example, a payer bank
might need to incur a cost in order to make a payment, while the payee enjoys a direct beneﬁt from receiving
the payment. In the context of a retail PS, the instantaneous beneﬁt is usually enjoyed by a consumer who
receives a good or service, while the cost is borne by its supplier. To ﬁx ideas, we will hence refer to the two
agents in the transaction as the “consumer” and the “producer,” respectively.
4In a sequel to this paper, Koeppl, Monnet, and Temzelides (2006) demonstrate that settlement is a
necessary feature of optimal payment systems.
4are rewarded through balance increases, while consumers are penalized through balance
decreases. These rewards and costs materialize when participants equalize their balances
during settlement. One case of particular interest arises when some of the transactions are
subject to monitoring, in which case the ability of the two parties to perform a transaction is
observable to the PS.5 In this case, we demonstrate that an optimal PS will “tax” monitored
transactions in order to “subsidize” the costs of providing incentives in transactions that are
subject to private information.
The second issue we study involves the frequency of settlement when there are oper-
ational costs associated with the settlement stage. Optimal settlement frequency implies
evaluating such operational costs against the constraints arising from the need to provide in-
tertemporal incentives. We discuss the optimal allocation of settlement costs. In our model,
such costs must be borne by those participants for whom some participation constraints are
slack. More generally, our approach provides a novel prescription for the optimal sharing
of costs associated with the operation of a PS (an example of which could be interchange
fees for credit-card use), across PS participants. In contrast to the standard arguments that
emphasize the role of competition, our approach highlights the role of default risk.
Settlement frequency is a key variable in actual PS design. High settlement frequency,
such as in real time gross settlement systems, implies high liquidity costs. On the other hand,
less frequent settlement, such as in net settlement systems, might lead to large net exposures
and to an increased probability of default by participants that have built high negative
balances. Currently, most actual large-value PS involve immediate settlement. As a response
to increased liquidity costs, several PS oﬀer short-term credit facilities, at the expense of
potentially re-introducing default risk. We argue that optimal PS design should explore the
trade-oﬀ between minimizing liquidity costs and dealing with default exposures. A strength
5For example, in some wholesale PS, banks interact mostly, but not exclusively, through a local network.
Such networks, which are often run by large correspondent banks, might have detailed information about
their participants. The same information, however, might not be available to the PS when a bank transacts
outside its network. Similarly, in the context of retail PS, a consumer’s credit card history might be readily
available within a credit card network, but not necessarily within other networks.
5of our approach is that these two costs have a clear counterpart in the model. The liquidity
costs in our model are represented by the ﬁxed costs of settling transactions. The default
exposure arises from the possibility of a long sequence of unfavorable balance adjustments.
This allows us to study this trade-oﬀ directly from fundamentals. We demonstrate that,
in an optimal PS, an increase in liquidity costs results in an increase in the frequency of
settlement and a decreased volume of transactions.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 introduces the model and discusses the concept
of a PS. Sections 3 and 4 discuss optimal balance adjustments, the optimal frequency of
settlement, and the distribution of settlement costs. Section 5 oﬀers a brief conclusion and
discusses some of the many possible directions for future research. The Appendix introduces
a continuous-time extension of the model and contains most of the proofs.
2 A Dynamic Model of Payments
2.1 The Environment
Time, t, is discrete and measured over the natural numbers. There is a [0,1] continuum of
inﬁnitely lived agents. The common discount factor is β ∈ (0,1). We assume a periodic
pattern of length n, in which n transactions stages, each consisting of exactly one bilateral
meeting for every agent, is followed by a round of centralized trading (termed settlement
stage) at the end of the last period.6 Discounting applies after each period, except between
the last transactions stage and the settlement stage. We describe the transactions stage and
the settlement stage in turns.
During the transactions stage, agents are randomly matched bilaterally in each period.
Randomness in the transactions needs is captured by assuming that in each period an agent
can trade with the agent he is matched with as a producer or as a consumer, each with
6Lagos and Wright (2006) introduced similar periodic trading patterns in monetary models. The contin-
uum assumption precludes aggregate risk. Issues related to optimal PS design in the presence of aggregate
risk are of great interest, but beyond the scope of this paper.
6probability γ. Thus, in each period during the transactions stage, an agent is in a trade
meeting with probability 2γ. Agents cannot pre-commit to produce in such meetings. With
probability (1−2γ), an agent is in a no-trade meeting. Production in the transactions stage
is perfectly divisible, and the produced goods are non-storable. Producing q units implies
disutility −c(q), while consumption of q units gives utility u(q) where q ∈ R+. We assume
that c0(q) > 0, c00(q) ≥ 0, limq→0 c0(q) = 0, and limq→∞ c0(q) = ∞. In addition, u0(q) > 0,
u00(q) ≤ 0, limq→0 u0(q) = ∞, and limq→∞ u0(q) = 0. Thus, there exists a unique q∗ such
that u0(q∗) = c0(q∗). The quantity q∗ gives the eﬃcient level of output, in the sense that it
uniquely maximizes the joint surplus created in a transaction. Since we concentrate on this
quantity for most of the paper, we will simplify notation by letting u denote u(q∗) and c
denote c(q∗).7
The information structure during the transactions stage is as follows. Whether or not
a trade meeting has occurred is always observable to the two agents in the meeting. This,
together with the identities of the two agents, is also publicly observable with probability α.
On the other hand, with probability 1 − α, neither the identities of the two agents, nor the
type of their meeting is observable by anyone outside the meeting.8 While the opportunity to
trade is not observable in non-monitored meetings, we assume that, should they take place,
production and consumption are always veriﬁable.
During the settlement stage, each agent can produce and consume a general non-storable
good. No other good can be produced or consumed during this stage. Producing ` units of
the general good implies disutility −`, while consuming ` units gives utility `. Thus trading
this good does not directly increase welfare. The settlement stage is frictionless in the sense
7We reiterate that what is important is that each transaction involves an agent that enjoys an instan-
taneous beneﬁt and an agent that suﬀers an instantaneous cost. In a wholesale system these costs and
beneﬁts will typically be associated with costly payments of size q made by one participant to the other.
The functions c and u provide a reduced-form way of capturing such costs and beneﬁts.
8This information structure can be interpreted as the result of the agents being divided into two symmetric
networks. Each agent needs to transact within his network with probability α, and with another participant
outside his network with probability 1−α. In this interpretation, “within-network” meetings are monitored,
while during “inter-network” meetings the ability to transact is private information of the trading partners.
7that, just as in Walrasian markets, agents interact in a centralized fashion, and there are no
informational frictions.
2.2 Payment Systems
An allocation for the above environment speciﬁes the quantity produced and consumed
during bilateral transactions, as well as the production and consumption of the general
good for each agent during settlement. In general, allocations may well exhibit history-
dependence. In this paper we largely study whether eﬃcient allocations can be decentralized
through a Payment System. A PS keeps a record of past transactions by assigning balances
to its participants. In addition, the PS instructs participants to produce or consume certain
quantities in trade meetings and speciﬁes rules for how the balances are updated given the
participants’ current transactions. Finally, during the settlement stage, participants trade
their balances against the general good in order to achieve a particular starting balance for
the next transactions stage. Agents with low balances can then increase their balances by
producing, while those with high balances can reduce them by purchasing consumption of
the general good. Since we model the settlement stage as a Walrasian market, the price, p,
at which balances are traded, is determined by market clearing conditions. We make three
additional assumptions. First, we restrict attention to allocations that are stationary and
symmetric across agents.9 Second, we assume that the PS can permanently exclude from all
future transactions agents that do not produce or consume the prescribed amount during
monitored transactions or do not settle their balances. Finally, we rule out short-sales of
balances in the Walrasian market. Later we will assume that each settlement stage involves
an aggregate (average) resource cost δ > 0 and study the implications of this cost for optimal
settlement frequency. For simplicity, in this section we ﬁrst formulate the general framework
assuming that δ = 0.
Formally, the PS keeps a record of all transactions. For any agent, in any given period,
9This is without loss of generality when, as is the case in most of the paper, the full-information-ﬁrst-best
allocation is decentralized.
8t, this record is summarized by his balance, dt ∈ R. First, consider the problem of an agent
in the settlement stage at time t. Let Vt(dt,pt) denote his value function if he exits the
last bilateral meeting in the transactions stage with balance dt, given that the anticipated
price in the following settlement stage is pt. Let Etvt+1(b dt,Ψt+1) denote the expected future
value of an agent who exits the settlement stage with balance b dt, given that the resulting
distribution of balances is denoted by Ψt+1. The problem of the agent is then given by
Vt(dt,pt) = max
`t,b dt
−` + βEtvt+1(b dt,Ψt+1) (1)
subject to
ptb dt = ptdt + `t (2)
b dt ≥ min{0,dt}. (3)
In this problem we have imposed the constraint that agents cannot short sell their bal-
ances in the Walrasian market. Note that, given a price level pt, Vt is linear in balances, dt.10
While it is not necessary for the results, linearity greatly simpliﬁes our analysis.
We now turn to the problem faced by the participants during the transactions stage. In
each period, agents are bilaterally matched. In non-monitored meetings, the PS receives a
joint report from the agents in the match. Formally, the two agents, say i and j, each report
a number ηi,ηj ∈ {0,1}. The agents’ identities become known to the system if and only if
ηiηj = 1. If either agent chooses 0, so that ηiηj = 0, the agents’ identities are not revealed
and the PS instructs them to exchange nothing. If both choose 1, they identify themselves
to the PS as being in a trade meeting. The potential producer is then instructed to produce
qt(dt,d0
t,Ψt) for the potential consumer. Note that qt can depend on both participants’
balances as well as on the overall distribution of balances. In a monitored meeting, no such
reporting needs to occur since in that case the type of the meeting is observable to the PS.
Hence, the PS instructs people directly to trade a quantity ¯ qt(dt,d0
t,Ψt). Again, this quantity
can depend on the balances of both participants as well as on the overall distribution.
Upon observing the reports, production, and consumption by every agent, the PS ad-
10This follows from an argument similar to that in Lagos and Wright (2005).
9justs their balances. An adjustment, Xt(dt,d0
t,Ψt), is added to an agent’s current balance,
conditional on his current trading history. Recall that an agent can be in a consumption,
a production, or a no-trade meeting. In addition, the meeting is either monitored or non-
monitored. This results in six possible adjustments for each transactions round which we
denote by {Lt,Kt,Bt, ¯ Lt, ¯ Kt, ¯ Bt}. More precisely, Lt(Kt) is the adjustment for a participant
who consumes (produces), while Bt is the adjustment for a participant who does not trans-
act in a non-monitored meeting. The variables ¯ Lt, ¯ Kt, and ¯ Bt are deﬁned analogously for
monitored meetings. Balances are represented by real numbers not restricted in sign, while
production of goods during trade meetings is restricted to be positive.11 Agents may decide
to leave the PS at any point. In that case, we assume that they cannot be re-admitted and
that they receive a permanent future payoﬀ that is normalized to zero. We can now formally
deﬁne a PS.12
Deﬁnition 1. A Payment System is an array
St(dt,d
0
t,Ψt) = {Lt,Kt,Bt,qt, ¯ Lt, ¯ Kt, ¯ Bt, ¯ qt}, for all t.
We restrict attention to PS that are incentive feasible. We term a PS incentive feasible if
(i) all agents have an incentive to participate in each transaction as well as in the settlement
stage, (ii) all agents in non-monitored transactions truthfully reveal their type of meeting
they are in, and (iii) the market clears in each settlement stage. The last requirement implies
11To further clarify the information-related problem, the diﬃculty is that whether or not a trade meeting
has taken place is not always observable to the PS. Thus, any arrangement must rely on reports by the
agents about the type of the meeting that has taken place. The transaction protocol we have formulated for
non-monitored meetings obtains the following interpretation. Each participant in the system has access to
both a “card” and a “card-reading machine.” Agents can choose to identify themselves to the PS by having
their card read by their partner’s machine (ηi = ηj = 1). In that case, the system becomes aware that the
two agents are in a trading meeting. The balances of both parties are then updated given their reports and
the production/consumption that has taken place.
12Strictly speaking, a PS must also condition on whether an agent chooses to participate in the system or
not. For simplicity, we leave this indicator variable out of the formal deﬁnition of a PS.
10that, in each t that corresponds to a settlement stage,
Z
dt
(b dt − dt)dΨt = 0. (4)
This, in turn, immediately implies that
R
dt ltdΨt = 0.13 To formulate incentive compatibility
(IC) and participation constraints (PC), we ﬁrst describe the value functions of participants
during the transactions stage. Recall that there are n bilateral meetings (one in each period)
between settlement stages. To ease notation, we denote the current-period immediate return
in period t by f(Xt), where Xt ∈ {Lt,Kt,Bt, ¯ Lt, ¯ Kt, ¯ Bt}. Thus, f (Lt) = u(qt), f (Kt) =
c(qt), and f (Bt) = 0. The adjustments for monitored meetings, ¯ Lt, ¯ Kt, and ¯ Bt, are deﬁned
similarly. If the last settlement stage occurred in period t, the value function during each






E[f(Xt+s) + βEt+s[vt+s+1(dt+s−1 + Xt+s,Ψt+s)]]dΨt+s−1, (5)
where E denotes the expectation over the type of meeting the agent will be in during the






E[f(Xt+n) + V (dt+n−1 + ¯ Xt+n,pt+n)]dΨt+n−1. (6)
Since consumption and production are veriﬁable, agents can only misreport during a non-
monitored transaction by claiming that they are in a no-trade meeting. Assuming that the
last settlement stage occurred at time t, allocations are IC during each round s = 1,...,n−1
of the current transactions stage if in all non-monitored transactions we have
f(Xt+s) + βEt+s[vt+s+1(dt+s−1 + Xt+s,Ψt+s)] ≥
f(Bt+s) + βEt+s[vt+s+1(dt+s−1 + Bt+s,Ψt+s)],
(7)
13As discussed earlier, the settlement round does not generate welfare. It redistributes welfare in a way
that results in a “re-initialization” of the agents’ histories. For a detailed discussion on this issue, we refer
to Koeppl, Monnet and Temzelides (2006).
14For example, αγ gives the probability that the agent is engaged in a monitored production meeting. To
ease notation, we have suppressed the dependence of the PS on (dt+s,d0
t+s,Ψt+s).
11where Xt+s ∈ {Kt+s,Lt+s,Bt+s}. Similarly, for s = n, IC requires that for all Xt+n,
f(Xt+n) + V (dt+n−1 + Xt+n,pt+n) ≥ f(Bt+n) + V (dt+n−1 + Bt+n,pt+n). (8)
Finally, PC require that agents have an incentive to remain in the PS during both the
transactions and the settlement stages. Thus, if the last settlement stage occurred at t, we
require
f(Xt+s) + βEt+s[vt+s+1(dt+s−1 + Xt+s,Ψt+s)] ≥ 0, (9)
for all Xt+s, and all s = 1,...,n − 1. Finally, for s = n we require
f(Xt+n) + V (dt+n−1 + Xt+n,pt+n) ≥ 0, (10)
for all Xt+n. The absence of short-sales implies that settlement involves a positive expected
lifetime payoﬀ, independent of any balance adjustments. Otherwise, agents would default
on their obligations. Formally,
V (dt+n−1 + Xt+n,pt+n) ≥ 0. (11)
In most of the paper, we will concentrate on implementing the full-information-ﬁrst-best
allocation, in which the eﬃcient transaction level q∗ is exchanged in all trade meetings, both
monitored and non-monitored.15 We have the following.
Deﬁnition 2. A PS is optimal if it is incentive feasible and if it decentralizes the eﬃcient
level of production, q∗, in all trade meetings.
To conclude this section, it is useful to specify two particular types of PS that we will
use extensively in what follows. A PS is simple if balance adjustments do not depend on the
agents’ current balances. A PS is simple and repeated (SRPS) if, in addition, it satisﬁes
Xt+s =
Xt+n
βn−s , and (12)
Xt+kn = X, (13)
15Linear utility in the settlement stage implies that the utility from consuming any amount of the general
good equals the disutility to the producer. Hence, the eﬃcient amount of the general good production is
indeterminate.
12where X ∈ {L,K,B, ¯ L, ¯ K, ¯ B}, s = 1,...,n, and k ∈ N. In the above expressions, t
represents the date of a settlement round. In words, adjusting for discounting, a repeated
PS imposes the same balance adjustments in each period of the transactions cycle. To
ease notation, we will drop the time index whenever possible. SRPS are convenient since
the linearity of V implies that, in any optimal SRPS, the incentive constraints for all s =
1,...,n−1 are fulﬁlled whenever those for s = n hold. In what follows, we restrict attention
to SRPS.
3 Optimal Balance Adjustments
In the previous section, we described an environment in which certain transactions are subject
to a private information problem. We introduced a payment system as a way to decentralize
incentive feasible allocations for that environment. In this section, we use this setup in
order to analyze some of the properties of optimal PS. We are particularly interested in
investigating how the PS can use monitored transactions in order to alleviate the incentive
problem in non-monitored transactions. To this end, we will ﬁrst take the length of the
transactions stage, n, as given, and assume that there are no settlement costs (δ = 0). In
the next section we study the issue of optimal settlement frequency when δ > 0.
3.1 Perfect Monitoring
It is instructive to ﬁrst discuss the case in which all transactions are perfectly monitored;
i.e., α = 1. This special case is convenient as it implies that there are no IC constraints.
Thus, incentive feasible allocations need to satisfy only market clearing in the settlement
stage and, of course, the PC. We will consider two optimal PS for this environment. First,
suppose that the PS sets all balance adjustments permanently equal to zero, and imposes a
“gift-giving” game in which agents are induced to produce in all trade meetings under the
threat of permanent exclusion in the case of a deviation. Since this PS does not rely on
any balance adjustments, there is never a need to trade balances in the settlement stage.
13Furthermore, agents have an incentive to participate if and only if
β
1 − β
γ(u − c) ≥ c, (14)
or, if the future expected discounted utility from staying in the PS is greater than the current
cost of producing the eﬃcient quantity, c. Provided that the above participation constraint
holds, this PS is optimal.
Second, consider a PS which uses balance adjustments in order to shift all costs related
to incentive provision to the settlement stage. Denote the minimum balance adjustment in
any given period by Xmin
t = min{ ¯ Kt, ¯ Lt, ¯ Bt}. Normalize the required starting balance after
the settlement stage in period t to b dt = 0.16 Agents that do not leave the settlement stage
with b dt = 0, as well as those that do not exchange q∗ in a trade meeting, are permanently
excluded from the PS. Hence, in equilibrium, the distribution of balances, Ψt, at the end
of each settlement stage is degenerate, for all t. The only potentially binding PC are then
given by





t+s,pt+n) ≥ 0, (15)
and





t+s + Xt+n,pt+n) ≥ 0. (16)
The ﬁrst constraint implies that an agent chooses to settle and remain in the PS even under
the worst possible history of adjustments. The second constraint is the PC for agents in the
last transaction round, conditional on having had the worst balance adjustment until this
round. Such agents still need an incentive to carry out the transaction as they can always
avoid the cost f (Xt+n) by leaving the PS prior to the settlement stage. Finally, the PS must




¯ Kt+s + γpt
n X
s=1
¯ Lt+s + (1 − 2γ)pt
n X
s=1
¯ Bt+s = 0. (17)
16This implies that the minimum adjustment will be negative, while agents that produce are rewarded
with a positive adjustment.
14When we restrict the PS to be simple and repeated, we can use (12) and (13) to simplify
this market clearing condition to
γpt ¯ K + γpt¯ L + (1 − 2γ)pt ¯ B = 0. (18)
Let p denote the (constant) equilibrium price in the settlement round. We then have the
following.
Proposition 3. Suppose that α = 1. If
β
1−βγ(u−c) ≥ c, the PS with no balance adjustments
( ¯ Kt = ¯ Lt = ¯ Bt = 0, for all t) is optimal. If βnu ≥ c, the simple repeated PS with balance
adjustments p ¯ K = p¯ L + c = p ¯ B + c is optimal.
All proofs are relegated to the Appendix. Notice that the condition that βnu ≥ c requires
that settlement is suﬃciently frequent. Thus, if n is large, the second PS is no longer optimal







the ﬁrst PS is optimal for the widest set of parameter values. In other words, provided that
this inequality holds, if an optimal PS exists, the ﬁrst PS is optimal. Of course, there exist
parameters for which both the above PS are optimal. The main diﬀerence between the two
is that the ﬁrst PS does not make use of the settlement stage, while the second one collects
all costs from incentive provision during the transactions stage and periodically resets the
participants’ balances through settlement.
3.2 Cross-subsidizing Transactions
Before we analyze the possibility of cross-subsidization, it is useful to ﬁrst consider the other
extreme case in which there are no monitored transactions (α = 0). In this case, the PS
relies on reports by participants about whether or not they are in a trade meeting. By the
linearity of V in d, the relevant IC in any period s, s = 1,...,n, during the transactions







In this case, the SRPS that uses the balance adjustments described in the second part of
Proposition 3 is optimal if and only if βnu ≥ c.17 Of course, as long as βnu ≥ c, this PS
also remains optimal for any α ∈ [0,1]. Indeed, even if α > 0, the PS can always treat all
transactions as if they are non-monitored, and make balance adjustments as in Proposition
3.
The above PS, however, does not exploit the fact that, as long as α > 0, some transactions
are monitored. The question then becomes whether an optimal PS exists in this case for
a wider range of parameters (that is, even if βnu < c). Such a PS would “tax” some of
the surplus created in monitored transactions in order to relax the incentive constraints by
“subsidizing” non-monitored transactions. The following Proposition asserts that this is
indeed possible.












For any parameter values satisfying the above inequality, the PS with balance adjustments
p ¯ K = p¯ L = p ¯ B = pB = pL = −(1 − α)γc and pK = pB + c is optimal.
The intuition behind this result is straightforward. First, recall that cross-subsidization
is only useful when βnu < c (otherwise we already know that an optimal PS exists). This,
together with (22), implies that (19) holds. Thus, without loss of generality, we employ
the PS that uses a gift-giving game during monitored transactions. The left hand side of
inequality (22) is the maximum total tax revenue that an optimal PS can extract when
it employs a gift-giving game. The right hand side gives the total subsidy required in a
17See Koeppl, Monnet and Temzelides (2006) for a formal analysis of this special case.
16settlement stage for the incentive constraints to be satisﬁed for non-monitored producers.
In other words, the above PS imposes a uniform lump-sum tax on all participants and then
uses the proceeds in order to make the incentive constraints for non-monitored producers
hold. Such a PS is optimal as long as the available taxes are high enough to subsidize the
cost of providing incentives to non-monitored producers.
We remark that the restriction to SRPS likely involves some loss of generality as such a PS
cannot extract all possible surplus. Indeed, a PS that would condition on the entire history
of all transactions since the last settlement stage could potentially redistribute surplus more
eﬃciently. Finally, note that, since we assume that βnu < c, condition (22) cannot be met
if α = 0, in which case there are no monitored transactions to ﬁnance the incentive subsidy.
It is worth pointing out that, as the above analysis suggests, balances in our model
are distinct from currency in at least one important way. When two agents transact using
currency, the amount of money that the seller receives is equal to the amount that the buyer
oﬀers. Here, however, in order for non-monitored transactions to be subsidized, it is necessary
that both the buyer and the seller in monitored transactions receive a negative balance
adjustment. The ability to implement such a policy, which is analogous to a transaction-
speciﬁc tax or subsidy, distinguishes the PS in our model from a monetary authority imposing
an inﬂation tax.
4 Optimal Settlement Frequency
4.1 Settlement Costs
In actual PS, settlement occurs only periodically due to both operational costs associated
with the activity itself, as well as liquidity costs that settlement imposes on PS participants.18
On the other hand, it is also recognized that infrequent settlement allows for the buildup
18While the former cost is the natural point of discussion in retail PS, the latter is a key issue for whole-
sale PS, in particular, for what practitioners call Real-Time-Gross-Settlement (RTGS) versus Deferred-Net-
Settlement (DNS).
17of overly large adverse balances by some participants. This trade-oﬀ raises the question
how to optimally balance such costs against the higher default exposure associated with less
frequent settlement. Our model captures the fact that infrequent settlement increases the
potential for default. However, the analysis so far has abstracted from settlement costs and
assumed the length of the transactions stage as exogenously given. For the remainder of
the paper, in order to investigate this trade-oﬀ, we assume that there is a ﬁxed cost, δ > 0,
that is incurred in each period in which settlement takes place. The existence of this cost is
important if one wants to study the frequency of settlement as a policy variable chosen by
the PS. Indeed, in the absence of such costs, our model implies that an optimal PS will have
settlement occurring after each transaction; i.e., n = 1.
To streamline the analysis, for the remainder of the paper we abstract from questions
related to cross-subsidization of transactions and study the benchmark case in which there
is no monitoring (α = 0). We will also assume that δ is small enough, so that settlement
must periodically occur as part of an optimal PS. Finally, we assume that δ is covered by
production of the general good during settlement.
Our ﬁrst goal is to characterize the values of n for which an optimal PS exists in the
presence of the ﬁxed settlement cost δ > 0. Building on our earlier ﬁndings, we consider a
PS that sets balance adjustments such that pK = pB + c = pL + c. This satisﬁes all IC
and PC (see equation (20) and (21)). The PS must also recover the cost δ. Hence, market














Assuming that participants share the settlement costs equally19, the value function, V , of
an agent prior to entering the settlement stage is now given by
V (dt,pt) = dtpt +
β
1 − β






We have again assumed, without loss of generality, that the PS sets the desired balance
at the end of the settlement stage to b dt = 0. Like before, the ﬁrst two terms of the value
19As we show in the next section, this is without loss of generality.
18function give the value of the agent’s current balances and the future expected utility from
participating in the PS, respectively. The last term gives the present value of all future
settlement costs.20
Like before, it is suﬃcient to check that the PC under the worst possible balance ad-
justments holds during the last period of the transactions stage. For the above PS, this


















One can use the market clearing condition to solve for the implied adjustment for consumers,










Substituting this into the PC, we obtain
β











Hence, any n satisfying this condition allows the above PS to decentralize the eﬃcient trans-
action level, q∗. We then have the following.
Proposition 5. Assume that α = 0. There exists an optimal simple repeated PS if and only
if
β











For any parameter values satisfying the above inequality, the PS with balance adjustments
pK = pB + c = pL + c is optimal. The optimal settlement frequency, n∗, is the maximum n
for which this condition holds.
Conditional on decentralizing an eﬃcient allocation, an optimal PS should minimize the
incurred costs from settlement. In other words, the PS must choose the longest length of a
transactions stage that is compatible with optimality, given the costs δ as expressed by (27).
Such an n exists as long as δ ≤ γ(βu − c). Note also that if n is large enough, we have that
β
nu < c. (29)
20The current settlement cost is contained in the agent’s balance, dt.
19Thus, if settlement is suﬃciently infrequent (n is suﬃciently large), the PC of an agent that
consumed n times in a row will be violated. In other words, there exists a maximum n such
that constraint (27) is satisﬁed.
4.2 Financing Settlement Costs
Throughout, we are assuming that the PS is self-ﬁnanced. This implies that the ﬁxed cost,
δ, associated with its operation must be entirely ﬁnanced by PS participants. In our analysis
so far, we assumed that δ is shared equally by all participants. Actual PS, however, diﬀer
substantially on their policies regarding the ﬁnancing of such costs.21
Here we study the division of δ across participants as a policy variable by performing a
comparative statics exercise for the case where there is a small increase in δ from its current
value, which we normalize to zero. For simplicity, we also set n = 1. Denote the value of the
cost paid by each producer by δK. Consumers and non-traders pay δL and δB, respectively.
Clearly, since we assume that the PS is self-ﬁnanced, we have
γδK + γδL + (1 − 2γ)δB = δ. (30)
The IC (20) and (21) are then given by
pK − δK − c ≥ pB − δB, and (31)
u + pL − δL ≥ pB − δB. (32)
Assuming, as before, that b dt = 0, and since the expected settlement cost in any future period
is given by δ, the PC (16) is given by
f(X) + pX − δX ≥ −
β
1 − β
[γ(u − c) − δ]. (33)
21While we associate δ with settlement costs here, our analysis applies to other costs associated with the
operation of a PS. One example is credit card fees in retail PS. There is an ongoing debate about whether
consumers or stores should be responsible for such fees. Another example is cost recovery in wholesale PS
involving banks. The discussion there involves whether the “payee” or “payer” should pay, as well as whether
the fees should be ﬁxed or volume-based.
20This PC implies that if an optimal PS exists, one can always construct an optimal PS by
setting balances such that pK −δK −c = pB −δB = pL−δL. Hence, we have the following.
Proposition 6. Suppose that an optimal simple repeated PS exists. Then, there exists an
optimal PS in which settlement costs are shared equally across all agents; i.e., δL = δB =
δK = δ.
The intuition for this result is straightforward. The right-hand side in (33) gives the
value of an agent who stays in the PS after settlement. This value is independent of any
history of past transactions. An optimal PS can always set balance adjustments so as to
make all PC exactly binding.22 In that case, when δ = δK = δB = δL = 0, the PS sets
pK = pB +c = pL+c. If δ increases, such a PS would increase the costs to all agents so as
to keep the incentives to participate the same across all agents.
The above argument continues to hold even if n > 1, as long as α = 0. Of course, other
cost allocations can also be consistent with an optimal PS. However, it is worth mentioning
that when α > 0, it is the PC for agents that have consumed n-times in a row that will
bind ﬁrst. In that case, any optimal PS will levy a higher share of the settlement costs
on non-consumers; i.e., δL = δB < δK. The rationale for this policy prescription is diﬀerent
from the standard argument that competitive forces drive the allocation of PS costs. Rather,
the above argument suggests that, in order to reduce their incentive to default during the
settlement stage, it is the agents who are most constrained that must pay the lowest share
of the costs.23
22This is not a necessary feature of optimal PS. However, if an optimal PS exists, one can always construct
another optimal PS that satisﬁes this property. In this sense, this property characterizes PS that are optimal
for the widest range of parameter values.
23This observation is consistent with the fact that interchange fees for credit cards are more likely to
be passed to consumers in countries where consumer credit-card debt and default rates on such debt are
relatively low.
214.3 Settlement Frequency and Transaction Size
It is recognized that in actual PS frequent settlement involves high liquidity costs. Less
frequent settlement, on the other hand, allows for the netting of exposures by diﬀerent
participants. At the same time, this could lead to default problems since it allows for
exposures to become too large. Recognizing this trade-oﬀ, actual PS often make provisions,
such as oﬀering short-term credit facilities, in order to economize on liquidity costs. A
strength of our approach is that the trade-oﬀ between liquidity costs and default exposure has
a counterpart in the context of our model. The liquidity costs are represented by the shared
ﬁxed costs associated with settling transactions. The exposure arises from the possibility of
building large negative balances if settlement is too infrequent.
So far in our analysis we termed a PS optimal if it decentralizes the eﬃcient level of
production, q∗, in all transactions. However, in the presence of settlement costs, an optimal
PS must explore the trade-oﬀ between reducing the size of transactions versus lengthening
the transactions stage. We now turn to the more general problem of determining jointly the
eﬃcient settlement frequency and the eﬃcient transaction size.
We assume that δ ≤ γ(βu − c). These costs must be small enough, so that it is optimal
for settlement to occur eventually. Based on our earlier result, since α = 0, the ﬁxed cost δ
is shared equally across all participants and is covered by production of the general good in
the settlement stage. In the Appendix we use a continuous-time formulation of our model in
order to set up the joint choice of settlement frequency and transaction size by the PS as a
planning problem. In order for the constraint set of this problem to be convex, it is suﬃcient
that the cost function c(q) is log-convex. Under these assumptions, we derive the following.
Proposition 7. Assume that c(q) is log-convex. Any optimal simple PS implies that qt =
ˆ q < q∗, for all t. Furthermore, as δ increases, the optimal transaction size, ˆ q, as well as the
optimal length of the settlement cycle, ˆ T, decrease.
The ﬁrst part of the Proposition conﬁrms our intuition. Proposition 5 already established
that (given that q∗ can be decentralized) the PS must optimally reduce settlement frequency
22as much as possible in order to economize on settlement costs. The above Proposition asserts
that it is also optimal to economize further on settlement costs by reducing the intensive
margin (i.e., the transaction size) below its ﬁrst-best level.24 This is equivalent to reducing
participants’ exposures prior to the settlement stage, by imposing a tighter cap on the total
amount of goods produced during bilateral transactions.
The second part of the Proposition is somewhat more surprising. It asserts that as a
response to an increase in settlement costs, an optimal PS must adjust both ˆ q and ˆ T in
the same direction. In other words, an optimal PS must reduce the volume of balance
adjustments that need to be settled in two complementary ways: by shortening the length of
the transactions stage, and by reducing the transactions size. The explanation for this is as
follows. The binding constraint on the PS is the PC of an agent that has consumed the most
during the transactions stage and, as a result, has to settle a large negative balance. An
increase in δ makes it more likely that this agent’s participation constraint will be violated.
Hence, in order to avoid default, the PS must decrease the potential exposure of this agent
by reducing his negative balance adjustments. This involves reducing both the quantity
produced and the time between settlement periods.
5 Conclusion
Under what conditions can a PS decentralize the eﬃcient volume of intertemporal transac-
tions in the presence of private information? We studied this question in a dynamic model in
which the ability of agents to perform at least some welfare improving transactions is subject
to random and unobservable shocks. In particular, we examined the interplay between mon-
itored and non-monitored transactions. In general, the optimal PS will tax the ﬁrst type of
transactions in order to subsidize incentive provision for the latter type. We also discussed
key issues for PS design related to optimal settlement frequency and cost recovery.
Our framework is certainly not limited to these questions and can be used to further
24One can show that an optimal PS involves a constant level of production across transactions.
23investigate several other issues related to payments. One open question is whether more
complicated payment systems than the ones considered here could decentralize eﬃcient out-
comes under less restrictive conditions. For the no-monitoring case (α = 0), restricting
attention to simple, repeated payment systems is without loss of generality. Due to linearity
in the settlement round, whenever the IC in the last period of the transaction stage hold as
equalities under such a PS, all other IC in earlier rounds also hold as equalities.
When some transactions are monitored, a PS that is simple but not repeated still cannot
improve on SRPS. Under any simple PS, only the total adjustments accumulated for the next
settlement stage matter. Thus, a SRPS can decentralize a constant production level in all
transactions that lead to at least as high total adjustments as any other simple PS. However,
a PS where balance adjustments are history-dependent within a transactions cycle can likely
improve on a SRPS. Hence, we would expect more conditional balance adjustments in PS
with better information about participants’ transactions.
An important current debate concerns the public versus private provision of payment
services. Given that our framework deals with dynamic incentives, we could investigate the
time consistency of various payment system policies since optimal dynamic schemes might
require some commitment. Finally, the existence of diﬀerent competing payment networks
and of tiered structures in PS, as well as extending the model to incorporate aggregate risk,
outlines a whole range of interesting issues that our framework can potentially address.
6 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 3
For the ﬁrst part of the proof, note that zero balance adjustments imply that there is no
trade in the settlement stage. It can then be easily veriﬁed that, when qt = q∗, for all t, the
PC for consumers, producers, and non-traders are the same for every period. The PC for
producers is fulﬁlled if and only if equation (14) holds.
24For the second part of the proof, we ﬁrst show that the PC (15) and (16) imply that all





(u − c) + pt(dt − b dt). (34)
Having normalized b dt = 0 for all t, the PC at t + n − 1 gives
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which is just the PC for adjustment X in the last transactions round. The last inequality
follows since Xmin ≤ 0, and market clearing implies E[Xt+n] = 0. Hence, the PC at t+n−1
hold provided that they hold for t + n. By induction, it follows that they also hold for any
t + s, s = 1,...,n − 2.
Next, suppose that βnu ≥ c, and let pt ¯ K = pt¯ L + c = pt ¯ B + c. Market clearing implies
that pt ¯ K = (1 − γ)c. It then follows that both PC (15) and (16) are satisﬁed. The PS is
thus incentive feasible. Since it decentralizes q∗, it is also optimal.
25Proof of Proposition 4












≥ c − β
nu. (35)
Deﬁne a PS as in the statement of the Proposition. It is clear that K 6= Xmin. In addition,
all IC are fulﬁlled and the PC for producers holds since pK ≥ pB + c. Market clearing
requires that
αp ¯ K + (1 − α)(pB + γc) = 0, (36)
or that
p ¯ K = −(1 − α)γc. (37)
The necessary and suﬃcient condition for the PS to decentralize the eﬃcient allocation in










− c ≥ −
β
1 − β
γ(u − c). (38)
All other PC hold if this PC involving the worst balance adjustment is fulﬁlled. Hence, we





βn − c ≥ −
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γ(u − c). (39)
Rewriting this expression we obtain
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≥ c − β
nu. (41)
This is condition (35).
For the converse, consider again the PS speciﬁed in the statement of the Proposition.
Under this PS, only the PC for monitored producers is binding. Suppose that one increases
¯ K by any amount ∆ > 0, and, at the same time, lowers all other balance adjustments by
26−
αγ






1 − βn. (42)
First, suppose that this condition is satisﬁed. The PS can then set pK = pB + c,









γ(u − c), and (43)
αγp ¯ K + (1 − α)γc + (1 − αγ)pB = 0. (44)
This PS is optimal for the widest possible range of parameters. Since B = Xmin, in order to
satisfy all PC, it must be the case that p ¯ K − c ≥ pB, or,
βn
1 − βnγ(u − c) ≥ γc. (45)





Suppose now that there exists an optimal PS while condition (35) is not satisﬁed. We have
just shown that in that case the PS with p ¯ K = p¯ L = p ¯ B = pB = pL = −(1 − α)γc and
pK = pB + c is optimal for the widest possible range of parameters. But then, as condition
(35) is violated, the PC for non-monitored producers, equation (38), cannot be satisﬁed, a
contradiction.
Proof of Proposition 7
In order to demonstrate Proposition 7, we ﬁnd it convenient to use diﬀerential calculus. To
this end, we develop a continuous-time version of the model. We assume that consumption
and production opportunities follow a Poisson process with arrival rate γ. The (continuous)
rate of time preference is now denoted by ρ. The ﬁxed cost, δ, is incurred whenever the
transaction process stops and settlement occurs. This occurs after a deterministic interval
27of length T. As before, we denote balance adjustments by (K(t),L(t),B(t)). All other
assumptions remain the same as in the text.
We let the random time before the next arrival of a trading opportunity be denoted by
τ. In that case, τ has a distribution function given by
F (t) = Pr(τ ≤ t) = 1 − Pr(τ > t) = 1 − e
−γt. (46)
Hence, the time until the next arrival of a trading opportunity is an exponentially distributed
random variable with distribution function F (t) = 1 − e−γt.
In order to determine, for any given q, the expected future payoﬀ for an agent at the end
of the settlement stage, we ﬁrst consider a PS that employs a gift-giving game as described
in the main body of the paper. Denote this expected utility by V0. It is straightforward
to show that an optimal PS involves a constant level of transactions. First, assume that
there are no settlement costs. Since both consumption and production opportunities are















(u(q) − c(q)). (48)
This is analogous to the lifetime utility under a PS that employs a gift-giving game in
the discrete-time version of the model presented in the text. In the absence of settlement
costs, equation (48) also gives the life-time expected payoﬀ of an incentive feasible PS that
decentralizes transactions of size q.
When costly settlement occurs after each time length T, it involves an aggregate (average)






1 − e−ρT . (49)




(u(q) − c(q)) − δ
e−ρT
1 − e−ρT . (50)
As before, we deﬁne the PS adjustments conditional on the agents’ reports by
pKt − c(q) = pLt = pBt, (51)
for all t. Also, since the PS is repeated, we have that adjustments, X, satisfy
XnT+t = Xe
ρ(T−t), (52)
for all t ∈ [nT;(n + 1)T], where n is an integer. As in the discrete-time case, such a PS
implies that all IC are fulﬁlled. In addition, this PS satisﬁes all PC for the largest set of
parameter values. Next, we derive the market clearing condition for the settlement stage.
This is accomplished by approximating total balance adjustments in an interval of length T.
First, note that the probability of having exactly n arrivals of trading opportunities in the
interval [0,t] is given by




For small ∆, we then have that
P[N∆ = 1] ≈ γ∆, (54)
where P[N∆ > 1] = o(∆). Next, deﬁne ∆ = T
m, where m ∈ [0,T] is an integer. The total
adjustment for producers over an interval of length T is then approximately given by





















As ∆ → 0, an agent will receive either none or one opportunity to trade during a time length
∆. In that case, using L’Hˆ opital’s rule,25 the expected total adjustments to producers are



















. The expected total balance adjustments to consumers are similarly






. Finally, expected balance adjustments over all agents
who have received no trading opportunities over this time interval can be determined as
follows. For each interval of length ∆, a measure 2γ∆ of agents are engaged in transactions
(γ∆ of them as consumers and γ∆ as producers). Therefore, the measure of agents who are
not involved in any transactions over an interval of length ∆ is (1 − 2γ)∆. As a result, the
aggregate balance adjustments for non-trading activities over the interval of length T are
given by

















[γpK + γpL + (1 − 2γ)pB] = −δ. (57)





The worst possible balance adjustment is assigned to agents that either never traded
















(u(q) − c(q)) − δ
e−ρT
1 − e−ρT ≥ 0. (59)
This constraint is identical to the one in discrete-time, simply adjusting for the continuous
time discount factor. Given these adjustments, an optimal PS chooses q and T in order to





(u(q) − c(q)) − δ
e−ρT











(u(q) − c(q)) − δ
e−ρT





The objective function expresses the discounted lifetime utility of a representative partici-
pant. The second constraint summarizes the PC that is potentially binding, while the third
constraint summarizes the IC and the market clearing conditions that must be satisﬁed in
any incentive feasible PS. The equality in the last equation follows from the fact that the PS
works for the largest set of parameters if it makes all IC exactly bind. The constraint set























The objective function is strictly concave in (q,T). In order to guarantee that the constraint
set is convex, we need an additional assumption. Given any T (q), the function on the
left-hand side of the above inequality is concave in q (T). However, the left-hand side is not
necessarily jointly concave in (q,T) due to the second term, which is a product of two convex
functions. We have the following suﬃcient condition for the constraint set to be convex.26
Lemma 8. Suppose that c(q) is log-convex. Then eρTc(q) is a strictly convex function in
(q,T), and the constraint set is convex.





(c(q))2 > 0. (63)
26A weaker condition is given by − 1
eρT u00(q)c(q) ≥ c02 − c00(q)c(q).
31The ﬁrst term of the LHS in equation (61) is strictly concave in q, while the RHS is strictly












2 > 0. (65)
Hence, as c(q) is log-convex, eρTc(q) is convex. The result follows since the sum of two
concave functions is concave.
Taking ﬁrst-order conditions with respect to q and T, we obtain the following character-



























where λ is the multiplier on the single constraint. This leads us to the following.
Lemma 9. Let c(q) be log-convex. For any optimal PS with settlement, we have ˆ q < q∗.
Proof. Since δ, γ, and ρ are positive, and the optimal settlement length is ﬁnite ( ˆ T ∈ (0,∞)),
we must have that λ > 0. Hence, equation (66) implies that u0(ˆ q) − c0(ˆ q) > 0. Since c is
increasing and strictly convex, and u is increasing and strictly concave, this implies that
ˆ q < q∗.














This condition, together with the constraint (61), characterize the solution (ˆ q, ˆ T). Solving

























A solution to the last equation exists by the Intermediate Value Theorem. Furthermore, any
solution must lay in an interval [q,q∗], where q > 0. The problem is that the left-hand side of
equation (70) is non-monotonic. Hence, there will, in general, be more than one solution to
this equation. The optimal solution, however, corresponds to the one closest to (and below)
q∗. The next Proposition relies solely on the fact that at this solution, ˆ q, the left-hand side
of equation (70) is locally strictly decreasing.
Lemma 10. Assume that c(q) is log-convex. As the settlement cost, δ, increases, the optimal
transaction size, ˆ q, as well as the optimal length of the transactions stage, ˆ T, decrease.
Proof. We establish ﬁrst that ˆ q and ˆ T move in the same direction; i.e., that d ˆ T
dˆ q > 0. Diﬀer-




















which is strictly positive, as u is strictly increasing and strictly concave, while c is log-convex.
Next, we show that ˆ q is decreasing in δ. Denote the left-hand side of equation (70) by

































































∂q < 0, or, equivalently, the left-hand side of equation (70) is strictly decreasing for
q suﬃciently close to q∗. Furthermore, Γ(q) converges to 0 as q → q∗. Hence, Γ(q) > 0 for q
suﬃciently close to q∗ and, by the continuity of Γ(q), there must exist a solution to equation
(70) for small enough δ > 0. Finally, since Γ(q) ↓ 0 as q → q∗, we must have that Γ0(ˆ q) ≤ 0
(with Γ having possibly a local maximum at ˆ q). This completes the proof.
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